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THE ILLUSION OF CLARITY

Suppose that, in 1938, the Prague government of President Edvard
Benes, foreseeing the inevitable dismemberment of Czechoslovakia after
the Munich Pact,

had infiltrated a trained death squad of German Jew-
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law, another version of which will be published in a Festschrift for Shabtai Rosenne and
which will ultimately comprise part of a legal trilogy to be published under the title:
Legitimacy, Commitment and Justice.
**Fellow, Center for International Studies, New York University School of Law.
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E. Greenberg Research Fund of New York University School of Law.
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ish exiles across the German border, in civilian clothing, to assassinate
Adolf Hitler. Suppose they had succeeded and had then fled to Holland.
How should international law govern this hypothetical event? Should
it require Holland either to try the assassins for murder or to return
them to Germany for trial? Or should it exculpate, even commend, the
assassins for a job well done? Or should the law remain silent? Would
the answer be the same if the assassins had also killed some German
civilian bystanders?
The hypothetical, we admit, is fragile in posturing such an exceptionally excellent justification for state terrorism. It is even more fragile in
imagining that what international law said about the problem would
make any real difference. Yet the hypothetical raises important questions
which, if we are to talk about terrorism and law at all, we must address.
The current spate of terrorist activity1 has engendered a flurry of
counteractivity, exhortations and efforts to do something about
it-among other things, to forge more effective international legal weapons against the scourge. At the annual meeting of the American Bar
Association in 1985, for example, President Reagan charged the lawyers,
"I want you to accept a challenge-to become part of the solution to the
problem of terrorism."2
In taking up this challenge, the lawyers must do more than devise a
law. If we are to effectively implement a norm, then the international
community must widely perceive the formula devised as legitimate.
Our hypothetical about Hitler's assassins challenges the legitimacy of
a straightforward prohibition that brooks no exculpatory factors, an approach that simply makes it an international crime for a state or an
individual, regardless of the circumstances, to engage in or promote terrorism. Since widespread support currently exists, certainly in the
United States Government, for such an unqualified prohibition, we must
pre-test its legitimacy and efficacy by resorting to such hypotheticals. To
honestly pursue such a formula, the law we advocate must be one with
which, considering all its possible future implications, we are willing to
abide. If law is to be part of the answer to international terrorism, we
must first define and explain the nature of the problem before we advocate a remedy in the councils of states. Such clarity of purpose, however,
is difficult to achieve and, too often, is merely assumed.

1. For an overview of terrorist activities and American responses to terrorism in 1986
see Oakley, International Terrorism, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 611 (1987).
2. The Network of Terrorist States, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2101, at 7, 9 (1985)
(address by Ronald Reagan).
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II.

PORFIRY'S PROPOSITION

In Fyodor Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment, Riodin Raskolnikov,
a poor student, kills a malevolent pawnbroker with an ax. Some staged
versions of the novel portray this event as an invitation to meditate on
transcendental guilt and expiation. Other productions, notably some that
Soviet directors in Stalin's time mounted, treated Raskolnikov's crime as
a revolutionary blow against oppressive capitalism, a symbolic call for
the overthrow of Czarist repression. However, in a recent version by the
exiled Soviet director Yuri Lyubimov, Porfiry Petrovich, the police investigator, proclaims: "Pity the criminal all you like, but don't call evil
good." 3 Porfiry, in that pivotal moment, is rejecting all excuses. To determine whether Raskolnikov's act is a crime, he says, one must refer
solely to what he has done, not why or to whom he did it. It is not that
Porfiry is immune to pity. He believes, however, that to allow pity to
shape the law would be to destroy legality and, ultimately, society based
on respect for law. Among citizens of an organized society, Porfiry believes, a social compact exists: a promise to act lawfully provided the
society punishes those who act unlawfully. The line between lawful and
unlawful conduct must be clear, simple and enforced, which is why one
should generally define crime by an act, not by motive or object. One
should delineate crime by what has been done, not why it was done or to
whom. The why and the to whom in certain circumstances may serve to
mitigate society's vengeance and even arouse pity, but no conceivable answer to why or to whom should be able to repeal the criminal character
of the act. Otherwise, the distinctions would threaten the fundamental
social compact because the line between what is and what is not permissible would become blurred. Why and to whom are dust thrown into the
eyes of the law, confusing and obscuring it.
Unfortunately for international lawyers in search of simple answers,
Porfiry's imagined defense of his proposition by reference to the social
compact presupposes systemic reciprocity. The social compact promises
those who obey the law that society will punish those who do not. Domestic legal systems, which generally enforce their law, meet this promise. Accordingly, domestic law does not usually recognize a right of disobedience based on the disobedience of another. In contrast, the more
rudimentary international community does not meet this promise. Its habitual failure to enforce law inevitably undermines the fragile normative
system, releasing tendencies of states to "take the law into their own
hands."

3.

N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1987, at 03, col. 2.
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This anarchic element in the international order is a socially-observed
phenomenon. What is the law's response to it? An international system,
unable to stop Idi Amin from conducting a reign of state terror in
Uganda, has several strategic options. The system may sanction the defensive use of counterterror by Amin's enemies or, recognizing that the
legal regime had broken down, it could permit every party to act as it
wished. Or it could enforce the norm against Amin's weaker enemies
even while failing to enforce it against Amin himself, arguing that some
law, or law for some, is better than no law at all.
None of these three strategies is satisfactory, presenting an unattractive choice. Porfiry, it seems, would choose the third option. The law is
the law. It brooks no excuses. True, some criminals escape unpunished
and authorities fail to enforce some laws against the powerful, but we
cannot permit even such egregious failings to dismantle the system.
Porfiry's creed came to mind on reading Judge Abraham D. Sofaer's
timely essay, Terrorism and the Law.4 In the essay the current Legal
Adviser to the Department of State harshly criticizes what he describes
as recent efforts to revise the international law criminalizing the killing
of innocents in civil wars, hostage-taking, piracy and crimes against diplomats by adding caveats that appear to give special consideration-such
as prisoner of war status-to those fighting against "colonial, racist or
alien" domination. He notes that treaties and General Assembly resolutions that purport to condemn as criminal-and seek joint action
against-various kinds of terrorist acts usually also contain some version
of a formula reaffirming the legitimacy of the struggle against colonialist,
racist and alien regimes. 5 The result, according to Sofaer, is that "international law has been systematically and intentionally fashioned to give
special treatment to, or to leave unregulated, those activities which are
the source of most acts of international terror." 6
His interpretation of the effect of such caveats, for example, on the
Hostages Convention7 or on the High Seas Convention8 is not beyond

4. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 901 (1986).
5. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 40/61 (Dec. 9, 1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 239 (1986).
6. Sofaer, supra note 4, at 922.
7. Sofaer directs his criticism at article 12 of the hostages convention. According to
article 12, to the extent the 1949 Geneva Conventions or the 1977 Geneva Protocols or
both are applicable to hostage-taking, and to the extent the Conventions or Protocols or
both require the prosecution or extradition of the hostage-taker, the Conventions or Protocols or both govern instead of the Hostages Convention. International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39), at
245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1457 (1979). (The United
States deposited its ratification of the Hostages Convention on December 7, 1984, and
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reproach. Yet even if he has correctly characterized those caveats, one
the Convention entered into force for the United States on January 6, 1985. Congress
passed concomitant domestic legislation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1203 (West Supp. 1986)). Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocols I & II to the Geneva
Conventions, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I & 11 (1977), reprinted in 72 AM. J.
INT'L L. 457 (1978). In other words, if the coverage of the Hostages Convention and the
Geneva Conventions/Protocols coincide, the latter controls, but in no event can one actually evade the prosecute or extradite standard embodied in the Hostages Convention. See
generally Verwey, The International Hostages Convention and National Liberation
Movements, 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 69 (1981).
Under the coverage of the Hostages Convention and its Geneva Conventions/Protocols
subset, the Hostages Convention would directly govern most instances of terrorist
hostage-taking. If the terrorist action takes place during a noninternational armed conflict, that act violates common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. However, that violation does not constitute a "grave breach" of the Conventions and consequently does not
give rise to an obligation to prosecute or extradite. Therefore, because the obligations
incurred under the Geneva Conventions fall short of the standards the Hostages Convention imposes, the latter controls. If a terrorist takes a hostage during an international
armed conflict, that act, if against civilians, violates article 34 of the fourth Geneva Convention and constitutes an explicit article 147 "grave breach" of that Convention, giving
rise to an obligation to prosecute or extradite. To this extent, the Geneva Convention
rather than the Hostages Convention directly controls. However, a terrorist group would
rarely be engaged in an international armed conflict. See infra note 22.
Sofaer accepts that article 12 of the Hostages Convention does not "create a legal gap
in coverage" but complains that its language by countenancing application of the Geneva
Conventions/Protocols, gives national liberation movements and terrorism a "rhetorical
and political victory." Sofaer, supra note 4, at 916. That assessment is wrong; the
twenty-nine countries that have ratified the Hostages Convention have accepted an idiots'
rule, see infra note 76 and accompanying text, with which Sofaer should identify. His
criticism aims at what the West widely regarded as a victory. As the State Department
emphasized at the time, article 12 "ensures that all those who violate the Hostages Convention will be subject to prosecution or extradition under either the Convention itself or
the Geneva Conventions/Protocols of 1977." Letter from Anthony Quainton, Director of
the Office for Combatting Terrorism, to Israel Singer, Executive Director of the North
American Branch of the World Jewish Congress (Dec. 11, 1979), reprintedin 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 420 (1980). An American participant in the negotiations enthusiastically reported that article 12 "underline[s] the application of the prohibition against the taking
of hostages as to liberation movements." Rosenstock, InternationalConvention Against
the Taking of Hostages: Another International Community Step Against Terrorism, 9
DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 169 (1980).
8. As Sofaer correctly notes, international conventions define piracy to encompass
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may still ask why they distress the legal adviser.
Several regimes powerful enough to get away with it contrive to practice colonialism, racism and alien domination, although these acts are
surely illegal in modern international law. South Africa in Namibia, the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan and Vietnam in Cambodia come readily to
mind as examples where the system has tolerated egregious violations of
human rights laws by malefactor regimes. Because the system seems unable to enforce its norms, others "take the law into their own hands."
The revisionists implicitly or explicitly accept that such struggles against
illegal regimes, in the absence of collective action by the international
community to bring violators of the law to account, may be justified or
excused. Even the United States Government, one hears, sometimes sup-

only "illegal act[s] of violence, detention or depredation, committed against a ship for
private ends." Sofaer, supra note 4, at 911; referringto article 15 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82
(emphasis added); see also article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, openedfor signatureDec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprintedin
21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). However, Sofaer is wrong to use this as "yet another" example
of third world irresponsibility or to imply that pirate-terrorism necessarily escapes international law. The exclusion dates to a 1932 Harvard Research Draft, composed long
before the third world's ascendancy. See Draft Convention on Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT'L L.
768-69 (Supp. 1932). Commentators have attributed its provision to an anachronistic
"Captain Kidd" model of piracy; to a desire to altogether avoid nineteenth century distinctions between the legal attacks of belligerents and the pirate attacks of insurgents by
definitionally excluding all "public" piracy; and to a perception that the flag state of the
captured vessel could adequately handle the matter by applying its own municipal law.
Note, Towards a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 VA. J. INT'L
L. 723, 731-32, 738 (1986); Draft Convention on Piracy, supra, at 786. Moreover, a
broader piracy jure gestum arguably survives these conventions and continues to supplement the conventions in condemning politically motivated attacks by parties to a civil
conflict when made against neutrals. See The Magellan Pirates, 164 Eng. Rep. 47
(1853); L. Oppenheim, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 612 (H. Lauterpacht, ed., 8th ed.
1955). Applying this broader definition to the 1985 seizure of the Italian liner Achille
Lauro by the Palestine Liberation Front, Gerald McGinvey concludes its captors were
pirates. McGinvey, The Achille Lauro Affair-Implicationsfor InternationalLaw, 52
TENN. L. REV. 691, 700 (1985). But see Note, supra, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. at 744. United
States law, that criminalizes "piracy as defined by the law of nations," might well refer
to this broader customary standard. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1651 (1984). The Department of
Justice, in its arrest warrants against the Achille Lauro captors, however, stated that the
seizure was in pursuit of "private ends," preferring to use the narrower treaty language
in charging the Palestinians with piracy. 24 LL.M. 1553, 1556-57 (1985). The Justice
Department apparently did not give credence to Sofaer's misgivings.
9. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) NotwithstandingSecurity Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 16 (Advisory Opinion); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion).
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plies arms and money to rebels fighting such rogue regimes. Sofaer, however, applying Porfiry to international law, sharply condemns the current perceived tendency of many states to embrace "the premise that
terrorist acts can be lawful in the pursuit of proper goals." 10 He underscores President Reagan's dictum that in a world where "there are innumerable groups with grievances . . . the first step in solving some of
these fundamental challenges, in getting to the root cause of conflict, is to
declare that terrorism is not an acceptable alternative and will not be
tolerated.""
Should international law invariably criminalize all terrorist acts entirely without regard for goals and provocations? Would Sofaer extradite
the hypothetical Jewish assassins to Nazi Germany?
We certainly do not intend to imply that an easy answer to such hard
cases exists. At the very least, however, a blanket policy of excluding all
exculpatory why and to whom factors is likely to create some considerable
dissonance or ambiguity in the minds of many sensitive persons. In other
words, such a law incurs legitimacy costs that may bear directly on its
public acceptance and, ultimately, on its effectiveness. Yet Sofaer is
surely right to point out that the other legal option-legalizing terrorist
acts of violence if committed for good cause against venal victims-could
open the door to even more selective enforcement, ushering in a final
breakdown of the social compact and releasing chaos. Evidently we will
not discover a conceptual, principled answer easily.
III.

THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS

In Porfiry's domestic jurisprudence, most law is what oriented, but
exceptions exist, of which justifiable homicide is the most comparable.
But what homicide can we justify? The common law chooses not to justify murder when starving passengers in a life boat save many by eating
one. English law extends pity, and perhaps even clemency, to persons
haplessly caught in such a no-win situation, but it leaves the norm clear:
cannibalism is always illegal.1 2 German codified law, on the other hand,
uses the opposite approach. It contains detailed exceptions to the normative prohibition, justifying in certain external circumstances what would
be impermissible in most others." Thus, under the German approach, a

10. Sofaer, supra note 4, at 906.
11. InternationalTerrorism, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2114, at 23 (Sept. 1986) (radio address by Ronald Reagan).
12. Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
13. German Penal Code of 1871, § 54 (G. Mueller & T. Buergenthal trans. 1961).
Cf Model Penal Code § 3.02 (1985). See T. FRANCK, THE STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIAL-
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sufficiently provocative exigency can transform cannibalism into noncannibalism or turn otherwise criminal conduct into sanctioned behavior.
The German approach has thus introduced the why factor into the definition alongside the what factor.
Just as each state has a choice between the German model and the
English model when it comes to regulating cannibalism, so too has the
international community a choice in respect to terrorism. In practice the
international community makes that sort of choice over and over in many
legal contexts, such as in various multilateral and bilateral treaties as
well as in investigations and resolutions of United Nations organs, suits
before the International Court of Justice or cases before the Human
Rights Commission and Committee. Sometimes the subject matter is terrorism per se; at other times it pertains more narrowly to sub-categories
or specific cases: the disappearance of persons, aerial hijacking, piracy,
the conduct of the Nicaraguan Contras, United States support for the
Contras, hostage-taking, the use of biological and chemical weapons or
the retaliatory United States bombing of Libya.
One should not doubt that international law could contribute to the
control of international terrorism. Possible sanctions include mandating
prompt extradition or prosecution of terrorists or terminating aerial communications or trade with a state that sponsors terrorism. The absence of
effective remedies has not inhibited the system, but the lack of definitional consensus has. The first step in dealing with terrorism is to define
it. Even Porfiry did not specify what constitutes the evil that should not
be relabelled good.
While no single, theoretical definition of terrorism is at hand, we take
some characteristics of terrorism to be axiomatic. We accept that terrorism is a form of violence in which governments as well as individuals
and groups engage. It applies equally to describe acts committed within
one country and acts committed internationally. Terrorism becomes an
activity potentially subject to international legal control when activities
within one country internally cross the threshold that international law
establishes-the prohibition on genocide is one example-or when the
terrorist activities or the terrorists cross national boundaries, or when
governments or persons in one country support terrorists in another.
Beyond such common ground, however, the definitional road becomes
rockier. Martin Boire, a Vanderbilt University Graduate Fellow, in a
recently published study14 more narrowly defines terrorism as an act em-

rrY 52-56 (1968).
14. Boire, Terrorism Reconsidered as Punishment: Toward an Evaluation of the
Acceptability of Terrorism as a Method of Societal Change or Maintenance, 20 STAN. J.
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ploying violence to injure or destroy, but primarily to instill coercive fear
against those not attacked in order to influence their behavior.1 5 But the
League of Nations directed the earliest international legal efforts against
terrorism, the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism,"8 at anarchists who had recently assassinated top government
officials such as the King of Yugoslavia and the French Foreign Minister, acts primarily intended to kill, not influence. Terrorists usually intend hostage-taking to gain concrete concessions, not just to sway the
public. Of course, all such acts have the added dividend for the terrorists
of demonstrating to the public that it is not safe to rely on their constituted authorities. 17 But all violence-even the pinpoint bombing of a
munitions factory-invariably has some such secondary fallout. To define terrorism as activity that is primarily intended as street theater is, to
say the least, as controversial as the question of what to do about it.18

INT'L

15.

L. 45 (1984).
Id. at 55.

16. The countries negotiated the treaty in response to the assassination at Marseilles
in 1934 of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Mr. Louis Barthou, the French Foreign
Minister. In response, the Council of the League of Nations passed a resolution stating
that "the rules of international law concerning the repression of terrorist activity are not
at present sufficiently precise to guarantee efficient international co-operation in this matter" and established a Committee of Experts to draw up a convention "to assure the
repression of conspiracies or crimes committed with a political and terrorist purpose."
Proceedingsof the InternationalConference on the Repression of Terrorism, League of
Nations Doe. C.94 M.47 1938 V, Annex I, at 183 (1938). This led to the Convention of
1937 for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. Id., Appendix I, at 196 [hereinafter 1937 Convention]. Unfortunately, although twenty-four countries signed the 1937
Convention, only one (India) ratified it. See Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418 (1972).
17. In the words of Secretary of State George Shultz: "The terrorists want people to
feel helpless and defenseless; they want people to lose faith in their government's capacity
to protect them and thereby to undermine the legitimacy of the government itself, or its
policies, or both." Shultz, Terrorism and the Modern World, 84 DEP'T ST. BuLL. No.
2093, at 12, 13 (1984).
18. Expanding upon Boire's definition, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act defines "international terrorism" as those activities that:
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State;
(2) appear to be intended
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in
terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear in-
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Nor has the Reagan Administration successfully grappled with the
problem of definition. Inconsistencies abound in public pronouncements
about the nature of the enemy-the problem-and cannot but complicate
efforts to think clearly about remedies.
For example, President Reagan, in a national radio address on terrorism, called for international action "against those who deliberately
slaughter innocent people."' 9 Did he mean to exempt from the category
assassins those whose targets are not "innocent"? The King of Yugoslavia? Porfiry, the police commissioner? Javanese settlers in illegally occupied East Timor? Note that the President's introduction of the qualifying concept of innocence in connection with the choice of victims alters
the definitional focus from a single-minded concern with the terrorist's
act to an additional focus on the terrorist's choice of victim. The definition, in other words, compels a departure from Porfiry's proposition because the guilt or innocence of the victim becomes a crucial legal factor
in determining the guilt or innocence of a Raskolnikov.
The recent decision by the United States Government not to ratify
Protocol I of 1977, supplementing the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 20 similarly signifies definitional ambiguity, 21 especially when one reads it in
conjunction with other initiatives of the same administration in Central
America. The Administration's reason for rejecting the agreement its
predecessors had negotiated and signed is that it would "internationalize" a domestic armed conflict involving a racist, colonial or alien regime

tended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or
seek asylum.
50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(c) (West Supp. 1986). See also Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3077(1) (West 1985). Under this statutory language, motive does enter the analysis-not to exculpate activity but to parse terrorism
from ordinary crime. This definition parallels prior international efforts. Article 1(2) of
the 1937 Convention, supra note 16, focused upon "criminal acts directed against a State
and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons,
or a group of persons or the general public." Similarly, the unsuccessful 1972 Draft
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism, which the United States proposed, targeted acts "intended to damage the interests of
or obtain concessions from a State or an international organization." Article l(d), Draft

Conventionfor the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of InternationalTerrorism, 67 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 431 (1972).

19. The New Network of TerroristStates, supra note 2, at 7.
20.

Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I (1977),

reprintedin 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (1978) [hereinafter Protocol 1].
21. President's Message to the Senate Transmitting the Protocol, 23

WEEKLY

Comp.PREs. Doc. 91 (1987) [hereinafer President'sMessage]. The President has also
requested that the Senate approve his action by a nonbinding vote.
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and thus extend combat status to the forces engaged. "Internationalize,"
in this context, means that the law would extend combatant status to
forces engaged in antigovernment activity.22 In his message to the Senate
President Reagan explained: "The repudiation of Protocol I is one additional step, at the ideological level so important to terrorist organizations,
to deny these groups legitimacy as international actors."2 3 Sofaer also
characterizes the Protocol as a "significant success" for "radical groups
[seeking] to acquire legal legitimacy. '2 4 But is it? The Protocol actually
seeks to circumscribe insurgent tactics. Article 51(2) prohibits "[a]cts or
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror
among the civilian population."' 5 Furthermore, Protocol I imposes sanctions on those who violate its provisions. Failure to carry arms openly
during military engagement and during deployment prior to engagement
expressly deprives a combatant of his right to be treated as a prisoner of
war.2 6 The combatant would thus face common criminal charges.

22. ProtocolI, supra note 20, art. 1(4), at 458, definitionally expands "international
armed conflicts" to include "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against facist regimes in the exercise of their
right of self-determination."
23. President'sMessage, supra note 21, at 91.
24. Sofaer, supra note 4, at 912.
25. Protocol I, supra note 20, at art. 51(2). Sofaer complains that terrorist groups
are both unwilling and unable to abide by the terms of the Protocol. Sofaer, supra note
4, at 913. Because no insurgent group has accepted Protocol I, see infra note 28, that
claim is empirically unverifiable. Surely the analogous failure of individual nation states
to comply with the terms of the Geneva Conventions does not mean its norms should be
scrapped. The obligations of governments, after all, are only reciprocal ones.
Sofaer also criticizes article 44(2), which provides: "While all combatants are obliged
to comply with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, violations of
these rules shall not deprive a combatant of his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into
the power of an adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war." For Sofaer, this
means article 1(4) terrorist groups will blithely violate the Protocol yet retain the protection it affords combatants. Sofaer, supra note 4, at 913-14. In fact, article 44 was the
result of "decisive participation of the United States delegation." Gasser, A Brief Analysis of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, 19 AKRON L. REV. 525, 526 (1986). According to
Ambassador Aldrich, the American chief negotiator, it grew out of the United States
experience in Korea and Vietnam during which American prisoners of war were punished for the misdeeds of their compatriots. Aldrich, Progressive Development of the
Laws of War: A Reply to Criticism of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT'L L.
693, 697-98 (1985). The article may create as many problems as it solves, but at least it
addresses actual problems growing out of recent practice and giving rise to justified, specifically American, concerns. Judge Sofaer's concerns, on the other hand, remain, as yet,
purely conjectural.
26. Protocol I, supra note 20, arts. 44(3), (4), at 475. This requirement, as a realistic effort to regulate guerrilla warfare, is less strict than the 1949 Geneva Convention on
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"[Mlaking the civilian population or individual citizens the object of attack" is a grave breach of the Protocol and, thus, constitutes a war
crime. 17 Finally, one should note that the Protocol would apply only to
subscribing governments and only in respect of antigovernment forces
that, likewise, have accepted these constraints.2 8
The Reagan Administration's rejection of Protocol I thus appears to
proceed from the belief that all irregular forces fighting any regime
are-by that circumstance alone-terrorists. Only on the bases of such a
definition can one make sense of the refusal to ratify.29 But does the
Administration really mean that? Does it accept that such a view would
thereby define all Contras in Nicaragua as terrorists? Does it not care
how an insurgent movement fights? Who it attacks? Whether the regime
it seeks to overthrow is democratic or totalitarian? While the Reagan
Administration may not like the categories of rebels that receive privileged combatant status under the Protocol, does it not have some pre-

Prisoners of War standard that all combatants bear a "fixed distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance." Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 4(A)(2)(b), 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. The
Protocol standard only applies to irregular forces, not regular army troops. Protocol I,
supra note 20, art. 44(7), at 476.
27. Protocol I, supra note 20, arts. 85(3)(a), (5), at 495.
28. The United Nations predicates implementation of Protocol I via article 1(4) on
both target state ratification and insurgent group acceptance of Protocol I (the latter
achieved by filing a unilateral declaration with the Red Cross pursuant to article 96).
While fifty-five states have accepted Protocol I, the two paradigmatic target states, Israel
and South Africa, have not ratified the Protocol. For that matter, neither has Afghanistan
nor Kampuchea. INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT 1985, 93-96 (1986). No
insurgent group has filed an article 96 declaration. Aldrich, supra note 25, at 702-03. Cf
U.N. Doc. A/35/710 (Annex) (1980) (African National Congress acceptance of "general
principles of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts"). Furthermore, because the
target state would be administering the Protocol, it would be loathe to agree with the
assessment that it was a racist, colonialist or alien regime, and would act accordingly.
For these reasons, the Red Cross Legal Adviser has termed the controversy surrounding
article 1(4) "mainly academic." Gasser, supra note 25, at 529. The head of the United
States delegation to the conference that adopted the 1977 Protocols bluntly calls the
clause a "dead letter." Aldrich, supra note 25, at 703. An additional prerequisite for
Protocol implementation is that the armed forces involved be ruled under a system of
command of a party and be subject to an internal disciplinary system. Protocol I, supra
note 20, art. 43(1), at 475. Few insurgent groups and fewer terrorists would meet that
standard.
29. Other criticisms of the Protocol have been lodged. See, e.g., Roberts, The New
Rulesfor Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional ProtocolI, 26 VA.
J. INT'L L. 109 (1985). Nevertheless, the Reagan administration has premised its rejection of Protocol I on its alleged legitimization of terrorism. See supra notes 21-24 and
accompanying text.
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ferred categories of its own in mind? Or does Washington truly believe
that all rebellion is to be put down and all authority is to be upheld by a
new Holy Alliance applying the harshest sanctions of international law?
The answer to these questions is that the United States has no answer,
or that it has many topical, opportunistic answers, but no general theory.
The babble of explicit definitions and implied principles makes it superficially attractive to attack the problem by a plea for simplicity: Porfiry's
proposition. As Sofaer would have it, not only do exceptions based on
why and to whom let too many terrorists slip through the enforcement
net, they also make it inevitable that victim states such as the United
States, whose citizens have become prime targets, will employ unilateral
"antiterrorist actions more primitive and dangerous than cooperation
among sovereign states." 0 Sofaer, like Porfiry, would say: pity if you
will the person who is driven to assassinate a dictator, or sympathize
with the hijacker who thereby escapes from and embarrasses a ruthlessly
oppressive regime, but do not immunize such acts of terrorism by creating a legal exemption for terrorists based on why and against whom they
are driven to kill, take hostages, or blow up buildings. One must exclude
such why and to whom factors from definitions of terrorism if the law is
to be effective.
Sofaer is critical of the aforementioned article 1(4) of Protocol I precisely because it considers such factors when it extends the Conventions'
humanitarian provisions, which have traditionally protected military
prisoners in international wars, to insurgents in internal wars in which
"peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation
and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of self-determination." 31 Sofaer objects to this because radical groups, in the United States
or elsewhere, that engage in acts of violence against the state may
thereby become entitled to prisoner of war status. He particularly deplores the introduction of the why factor. "Never before," he complains,
"has the applicability of the laws of war been made to turn on the purported aims of a conflict." Furthermore, "this provision obliterated the
traditional distinction between international and noninternational armed
conflict." 2 In other words, the law of war which had previously applied
in a clearly defined what-armed, uniformed soldiers in a conflict between two or more states-is extended to civil war guerrillas who are

30. Sofaer, supra note 4, at 922.
31. Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 1(4), at 458. The Protocol achieves this extension
of coverage by appellating these internal wars "international armed conflicts." See supra
note 22.
32. Sofaer, supra note 4, at 913.
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fighting for the "good" of self-determination-the why factor-against
the "bad" of racists, colonialists or alien dominators-the to whom factor. The United States decision not to ratify this protocol manifests a
refusal to accept such a shift from a law of war that is what based to one
that why and to whom considerations modify.
Sofaer is not the only individual to infuse Porfiry into international
law. To return to assassinating Adolf Hitler: A leading representative of
a Third World country at the United Nations, Ambassador Kishore
Mahbubani, recently noted that faced with a draft treaty which would
make it an international crime to assassinate a head of state, one could
expect every nation in the General Assembly "except perhaps Israel" to
vote against any attempt to make a textual distinction between killing
Adolf Hitler and Olof Palme.3 8 Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which flatly prohibits all use of force by one state against another,
condoning neither why nor to whom exculpations, provides another example of the refusal to make distinctions.
Despite these postures, international actors-including the Reagan
Administration-have quickly abandoned Porfiry when convenient. For
example, the most persuasive explanations for such acts as the United
States invasion of Grenada in 1983 turn on a synthetic international law
modified by humanitarian pity. 4 The invasion reflected a belief that the

33. Interview with Kishore Mahbubani, U.N. Ambassador, in New York City (January 21, 1987). Heads of State might simply be more ready to take a strict Porfirian
view when it comes to looking after their own interests, as diplomats have done in another treaty, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against International Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T.
1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8432, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167. Note, however, that the resolution by
which the General Assembly adopted the Convention contains the following ritualistic
formula recognizing that: "[T]he provision of the annexed Convention could not in any
way prejudice the exercise of the legitimate right to self-determination and independence
• . .by peoples struggling against colonialism, alien domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid. . . ...
G.A. Res. A/3166, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
30), at 147, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). While the resolution maintains that it should
always be published in tandem with the Convention, its provisions are not part of the
treaty. Nor, significantly, do the quoted words say that the very specific duties to extradite or prosecute contained in the Convention are in any way less applicable to terrorists
who act against diplomats of colonial, alien, or racist regimes. If the United Nations had
intended that effect, it would have had to make it explicit and include it in the treaty
itself. The above quoted provision in the Assembly's resolution is essentially meaningless
window dressing.
34. The United States adduced several humanitarian grounds for the Grenada invasion: (1) "to protect innocent lives, including up to a thousand Americans," (2) "to restore order and democracy on the island of Grenada" at the request of its Governor
General, and (3) to end "an unprecedented threat to the peace and security of the re-
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international system should exculpate military takeover of a sovereign
state because of, among other considerations, the inhuman conditions its
government had created and dangers to the lives of United States citizens
on the island. Such a belief is hardly consistent with Porfiry's
proposition.
However, at the same time, states that regularly insist on introducing
why and to whom exculpations into any international agreements for the
suppression of terrorism chided the United States35 for violating the rule
of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force against sovereign states while privately acknowledging the evident fact that the action
had afforded Grenadans and visitors welcome relief from a murderous
regime. Following Porfiry's analysis, these states pointed out that article
2(4) does not-and should not-distinguish between expansionist aggression and swift, surgical humanitarian intervention." To introduce
why and to whom exculpations, as the United States sought to do in defending its action, was unacceptable to many governments because they
felt it would start the world down the slippery slope towards unbridled
aggression. This is the same fear of the slippery slope, of conceptual
complexity, that makes it unpalatable to distinguish between Adolf
Hitler and Olof Palme in an anti-assassination treaty. But nations that
profess to fear the slippery slope effect were they to recognize the obvious benefits accruing from the United States invasion of Grenada seem
to have no trace of vertigo when they vote to permit or even encourage
states to aid insurrectionist movements fighting racist or colonialist
regimes.
What we have, then, is a gaggle of self-contradictory, topical and op-

gion" at the joint request of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Barbados and
Jamaica. Situation in Grenada, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1487 (Oct. 25, 1983);
United States Forces in Grenada,id. at 1493 (Oct. 25, 1983). State Department officials
have been adamant that the invasion comported with human rights. See, e.g., Grenada:
Collective Action by the Caribbean Peace Force, 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2081, at 74
(1983) (statement of Jeane Kirkpatrick); Human Rights Implicationsfor U.S. Action in
Grenada, 84 DEPT. ST. BULL. No. 2083, at 24 (1984) (address by Elliot Abrams).
35. G.A. Res. 38/7, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 470), at 19, U.N. Doc. A/38/P.V.
43 (1983). The resolution "deeply deplore[dl the armed intervention in Grenada, which
constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of that state." The White House responded: "We find it sad that
the United Nations sees fit to 'deplore' actions taken for humanitarian reasons, to save
innocent lives, and protect human rights, in full accord with the principles of the U.N.

Charter." Grenada: Collective Action by the CaribbeanPeace Force, supra note 34, at
78.
36.

For an excellent discussion of this question, see Schachter, In Defense of InternaCHI. L. REv. 113 (1986).

tional Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U.
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portunistic reasons-excuses-for positions taken, a shadowplay about a
basic conceptual dilemma. Porfiry does not tell us why we should divorce
pity from law. A justification for his proposition is not self-evident. Cannibalism, the treatment of prisoners in civil wars and Raskolnikov's
crime all raise the same profound issue. We have tended to base the
answers, however, on momentary self-interest and implicit assumptions
37
rather than on principled discourse.
Justifications that commentators have proferred fail to withstand scrutiny. Sofaer suggests that the tendency to include why and to whom factors in recent lawmaking regulating terrorism has cut too many holes in
the net we use to catch terrorists. Yet a reason is not a theory of choice.
He tells us of his preference for a what-based definition of terrorism
because it catches more terrorists. But a different definition of terrorism,
one that also takes exculpatory why and to whom factors into account,
allows through its net only those who by definition are not terrorists.
The Sofaer justification for simple what law really does not get beyond a
preference for catching more violent persons by expanding the definition
of terrorism to include more actors. Similarly, those who, fearing the
slippery slope, argue for a strict construction of article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter to prohibit every use of force, are merely expressing
their preference for sovereignty as the highest global value even at the
cost of sacrificing such other values as life and liberty. They believe it of
utmost importance to catch more violent states. That value choice makes
it unnecessary to distinguish between Tanzania's liberation of Uganda
from Idi Amin, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan, the
Indian Army's entry into what is now Bangladesh, the United States role
in Grenada, Israel's rescue of the hostages at Entebbe, and so forth. The
"slippery slope" theory argues that the law is incapable of making such
distinctions even if they are evident to the naked moral eye. Yet, as our
statutes pertaining to murder and manslaughter illustrate, laws can and
sometimes do make such distinctions. If they are not, or should not be,

37. John Rawls has endeavored to construct a principled discourse. See J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). His "veil of ignorance" model posits an individual who has
knowledge of society but does not know his position within that society. This individual,
fearing the worst, will try to maximize the minimum position, i.e., to establish the highest social floor as possible. The result, according to Rawls, is: (1) strictly egalitarian
political rights; and (2) unequal economic distribution only to the extent that incentivecreated wealth that results from inequality improves the worst-off position.
Rawls, however, presupposes an advanced community, one socially cohesive and economically advanced. While he generally approves of modern international law principles,
such as the right to self-determination, how Rawls would respond to the legal problems
of terrorism is open to speculation. See id. at 377-82.
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made in reference to terrorism, it is not because of any structural disabilities inherent in law itself. It would only be because the system will have
chosen Porfiry's simplicity to a more calibrated way of defining and regulating the problem.
To choose a definitional strategy that one can only justify on the
ground that it catches more people than does a competing one, however,
is far from satisfactory. Professor Christopher H. Pyle has recently condemned that sort of reasoning in an article in ForeignPolicy. He charges
that the 1986 amendment to the United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty,3" by focusing only on what the person being sought for extradition had done, ignoring why it was done and to whom,
is both simplistic and crude. It does not ask whether an uprising was in
progress, whether the uprising was popular, whether the regime had been
oppressive or whether the alleged conduct of the accused was vicious, wanton, odious, cruel or unauthorized. Rather, it pretends to preserve the political crimes defense-but only for people who write letters to the newspapers-while categorically declaring that all persons who engage in
shootings and bombings as part of an uprising are not "political" and thus
cannot be shielded from extradition.
This categorical approach purports to seek a humanitarian objective:
the punishment of people accused of murder, bombing, hijacking, hostagetaking and similar acts. In so doing, however, it denies that Americans
might sometimes refuse to condemn such actions-for example when used
in attempts to escape from police states such as the Soviet Union.3"
To choose between Sofaer and Pyle thus seems to have immediate
practical implications for the definition of, and thus the choice of remedies for, terrorism. Should the law protect a captured Provisional Irish
Republican Army gunman and entitle him to the treatment of a protected combatant?' 0 If he reaches the United States, should he have political sanctuary, or should the Attorney General extradite him to stand
trial for murder in Britain? Whether Britain tries him for armed insurrection and treason could depend on whether Geneva Protocol I of 1977
applies. Whether he is extraditable depends on whether the new parts of
the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty apply. The
1977 Protocol, as we have observed, includes a why and to whom factor
in its definition of the act being regulated; the United States and the
United Kingdom negotiated their treaty, however, precisely in order to
38. Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985,
United States-United Kingdom-Northern Ireland, 24 I.L.M. 1105.
39. Pyle, Defining Terrorism, FOREIGN POL'Y No. 64, at 63, 75 (1986).
40. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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ensure that the what factor, alone, is determinative.
It seems that we must choose, as a first step in the fight against terrorism, either to embrace or to reject Porfiry's proposition. That, at least, is
what his champions and detractors seem to be saying. As rational beings,
however, we must do more than choose between authors of competing
definitions of terrorism. Our task is no less than to develop a coherent
theory for choice. In doing so, however, we will discover that neither
Sofaer nor Pyle are categorically right or wrong. Rather, they have taken
us on an intellectual wild goose chase toward an unanswerable, and thus
operationally irrelevant, question. We will then be ready to formulate
the right question, to which we may be able to devise an answer capable
of validation. That answer may even help us to begin to conceive an
effective strategy for dealing with terrorism.
But first things first. Before making or refusing to make the choice for
or against Porfiry's proposition-or before formulating the quite different proposition we will insinuate in its place-we must first consider the
basis for choice. That brings us to the matter of legitimacy. One must
remember that we are seeking an effective legal strategy to combat
widely perceived social disorder. The problem of defining the disorder, at
least initially, is the same as that of fashioning a remedy: i.e., what are
we trying to prevent? One can pose that problem somewhat more precisely by looking at the definitional question-understood as a first step
toward devising an effective remedy-from the operational perspective.
We would then ask: what kinds of remedies against the perceived social
problem of terrorism are likely to be regarded as legitimate and by
whom. Legitimacy, in this context, is not solely an abstract moral principle but has direct operational consequences to any effort to contain the
problem.
IV.

LEGITIMACY

Once one understands that a wide-open field for choice exists, with no
single, self-evident or easily justifiable answer, one reaches the proper
starting point for any critical analysis of Porfiry's proposition. What is
one to make of those who engage in violence for good causes against
pernicious forces? Should one pity the criminal, or should one, by taking
those why and to whom factors into account, sometimes redefine "evil" as
"good"?
To approach that seemingly insoluble but ineluctable problem of
choice, one must posit, examine, and in due course, validate in a principled, reasoned manner that is generally perceived to be convincing, the
intellectual process by which one exercises the choice. As Max Weber
explains, authority, norms, institutions and social action are legitimate
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only when the preponderance of those affected subjectively endorse and
accept them.41 More broadly, Jurgen Habermas identifies a sociocultural
historic consensus for determining the principles of governance and distribution of "goods" as the essence of a legitimating system. Norms,
Habermas points out, are rooted in "structures of linguistically produced
inter-subjectivity. ' 42 They interpret needs and they license or mandate
actions. A process of justification in which validity claims are "redeemed
discursively" legitimizes them. 43 This discursive redemption takes the
form of claims of "correctness or appropriateness" ' 44 that move away
from particularist opinion-wants, pleasure, pain-towards propositions
"with a claim to generality. '45
Habermas' analysis has been useful in directing our inquiry into the
phenomenon of legitimacy as it impinges on efforts to regulate terrorism.
Legitimacy, as we will use it in this discourse, is the quality that attaches
to a choice of conduct-for our purposes, specifically, law-making and
law-enforcing conduct-when it is justified discursively and the community generally recognizes its claim of correctness or appropriateness,
raised in empirical statements, as a basis for action. While communities
can also achieve the generality and intersubjectivity that underpins nor-

41. 1 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 217 (G. Roth and C. Wittich eds. 1968).
42. J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 10 (T. McCarthy, Jr. trans. 1975).
43. Id.
44. Id.
'45. Id. One could proffer alternative definitions of legitimacy. See generally Richards, Terrorand the Law, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 171 (1983). Habermas' stress on discursive
redemption, a concept rooted to collective action, is analytically akin to the notions of
legitimacy that Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart have advanced. For Kelsen, the norms
upheld by the legal culture of academic and bureaucratic lawyers become the metric of
legitimacy. See H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (A. Wedberg,
trans. 1945); THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (Knight, trans. 1967). In Hart's recalibration,
he equates norms to behavioral conformity and critical attitudes, collectively defined. See
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
In contrast, natural law theorists argue legitimacy in terms of overarching substantive
principles. The vigor of their arguments range from Lon Fuller to John Locke. Under
Fuller's theory of the internal morality of the law, eight characteristics are intrinsic to a
system of law: generality, publication, prospectivity, intelligibility, consistency, adjustment to human capacity, stability sufficient to orient behavior and congruity between the
rule as announced and as applied. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1963).
Fuller's theory aims to preclude legal arbitrariness; it manifestly does not prevent a regime of unjust laws. More assertive, John Locke demands that countries not only apply
the law evenhandedly but that the law conforms to fundamental human rights, underpinned by the individual right to conscience. See J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GovERNMENT (P. Laslett ed. 1960) (3d ed. 1698); see also Richards, Conscience, Human

Rights, and the Anarchist Challenge to Obey the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 771 (1984).
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mative legitimacy by sociocultural conditioning or received religious revelation, in the modern world they most often achieve it by general consent
tested and tempered in open discourse. This does not necessarily imply
that legitimacy is synonymous with enactment by parliamentary democracy, both in the sense that the community may widely perceive some
laws made that way-for example, by lobbying tactics or on the basis of
data later proven false-to be outside the legitimating consensus and,
also, because means other than parliamentary means, ranging from a
plebescite to leadership of a community by an effective prophet or
teacher or by respected elites such as tribal elders can produce a consensus.4 6 Rather, we use legitimacy to denote a widespread sense of a law's
appropriateness and fairness. It should be obvious that anyone advocating a law is well-advised to pursue a norm that is also widely perceived
to be legitimate, since the law's effectiveness will generally depend on an
appropriate quotient of acknowledged legitimacy. Let us attempt to
illustrate.
One of the authors has a house in a small village sixty miles from
New York City which he reaches by the Long Island Expressway. At
one mile intervals, New York State has posted 55-mile maximum and
35-mile minimum speed limit signs along both sides of the roadbed and
on overhead electronic billboards. The law, as thus stated, concerns only
the what, which takes the form of miles per hour. This law is clear,
requires no sophisticated formulation and, surely, features ease of application. Some legislature must have voted for it. Everyone understands it
the same way and everyone knows, quite precisely, whether their vehicles are, or are not, in compliance. Yet many drivers perceive the law as
illegitimate. Its illegitimacy appears in a number of illustrative contexts.
Almost all motorists flagrantly disobey the law's upper limit. Most cars
travel at speeds substantially in excess of the posted limit. The failure of
the vast preponderance of the society to respond to the law's clear stricture indicates that it has lost whatever legitimacy it may once have enjoyed during the gasoline shortage when the government enacted it as a
conservation measure. Also, habitual non-enforcement has weakened the
social compact underpinning the law, thereby releasing those who are
normally law-abiding from the law's social (but not its legal) strictures.
That condition of conflict between social and legal stricture also undermines the law's legitimacy. Laws that the community perceives to be
partially enforced-in either sense of the word, i.e., only partially ap-

46. For an analysis of the role of ritual and culture in establishing the legitimacy of
authority and its exercise, see H. WECHSLER, OFFERINGS OF JADE AND SILK: RITUAL
AND SYMBOL IN THE LEGITIMATION OF THE T'ANG DYNASTY (1985).
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plied or applied with partiality-become illegitimate.
Second, as to the law's prohibition against dawdling, it is clear to everyone that almost any car travelling at less than 35 miles per hour must
in some way be seriously disabled and should, therefore, be free to travel
at any speed prudent under the circumstances. The Long Island Expressway is no haven for "Sunday drivers," who appear to be the object
of the lower limit. Consequently, that limit-perfectly appropriate to
other roads that attract dawdlers-would be ludicrous if the state were
to apply it, for example, on the expressway to a car with a flat tire. A
law that the community generally perceives as ridiculous-that is, logically absurd in the light of any reasonably predictable set of contingencies-incurs some legitimacy costs.
The example illustrates three factors relevant to determining popular
perception of a law's legitimacy: (1) general adherence; (2) rationality;
and (3) generality and consistency of implementation. Other elements
relevant to the sense of law's legitimacy exist-we have already noted
the depth of the law's cultural roots and the procedural openness of the
process by which societies enact laws-but these can be subsumed under
our three basic factors.
V.

IDIOTS' LAW AND SOPHISTS' LAW

Beyond the tautological reasons for Porfiry's, Sofaer's or Pyle's proposition, we believe lie unenunciated value decisions. Porfiry prefers simplicity, in law, while Pyle prefers legal sophistication. Porfiry, to bolden
our point, has a value attachment to "idiots' law" while Pyle has an
equally determinative attachment to "sophists' law." Both terms, which
are central markers in the ensuing analysis, are meant to be neutral. The
term "idiots' law" is intended to conjure up the qualities of another of
Dostoyevsky's characters: Prince Myshkin, the Christ-like figure in The
Idiot, whose characteristics include his single-minded passion for arrowlike truths, simple principles and comprehensive mastery of self and
others in accordance with these invariable verities regardless of dangerous, even absurd, consequences. We use the term "sophist" not in the
pejorative sense in which Plato used it, but rather, in its original meaning of intense scrutiny of simple ideas to plumb their multilayered complexity. This process of skeptical analysis of simple "truths," which fifth
century B.C. Greek philosophers evolved, is the one which led to a more
textured understanding of ideas and of reality. 47 We use "sophist" to
convey the same approach to legal conceptualization, one tailored with a

47.

G. KERFERD, THE SOPHISTIC MOVEMENT 59-67 (1981).
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careful eye to detail.
It is our contention that one cannot make a principled choice between
these propositions, no matter how passionate the clash between the partisan advocates of each. Both idiot and sophist preferences are defensible,
but no one has examined, let alone justified, either preference systematically. As theoretical constructs, which the waves of advocacy for or
against particular regulatory systems have submerged-as with the 1977
Geneva Protocol and the United States-United Kingdom Extradition
Treaty-the preference for simple, or for sophisticated, legal norms may
be just one indication of the advocate's larger hierarchy of values.
Porfiry's proposition is an implied plea for simplicity. Pyle, on the
contrary, opts for sophisticated complexity. Sofaer, on Porfiry's side, prefers laws (such as the United States-United Kingdom Extradition
Treaty) that define terrorist offenses in terms of simple, inclusive what
categories of activity. Pyle proposes instead a complex, exculpatory, judicially-determined case-by-case approach. This sophists' law, for example, mandates that the act of killing a British constable in Northern Ireland might be exculpable if the killer were fighting for social j'istice
rather than promoting a leftist or rightist autocracy (or personal gain)
and if the dead British constable were a collaborator in an oppressive,
unjust regime rather than an innocent servant of an open, progressive
democracy.
In extradition proceedings, instead of flatly ruling out the possibility
of a legitimate uprising against a certain foreign government, Pyle argues that a judge should "consider the alleged inhumanity of the actions
of the accused in light of the general nature of the conflict-which is
' Similarly, Martin C.
determined in part by the opposing side's tactics." 48
Boire concludes that "the use of community terrorism" against oppressive regimes should be deemed lawful "when it remains the only effective
tool for the restoration or maintenance of a representative democratic
form of government." 4
It is worth noting that Pyle's and Boire's sophisticated, exculpatory
complexity, summoning the law to distinguish between good or bad motives for acts and good or bad victims of actions, has both an historic
pedigree and a contemporary counterpart. Historically, the "just war"
doctrine struggled to make those distinctions from the time of Constantine. Early Church theologians, having to reconcile Christian pacifist
theology with Imperial military needs, reworked older Greek and Ro-

48.
49.

Pyle, supra note 39, at 75.
Boire, supra note 14, at 133.
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man principles to arrive at a Christian norm.5" At first, people equated
the just war with campaigns to save the Roman Empire, which they
perceived as a divine institution.51 In the wake of the Empire's fall, Augustine anchored the just war doctrine to the need for resisting both internal and external challenges to Christian unity. 52 The Augustinian
concept foreshadowed the just war doctrine as Thomas Aquinas formulated it, which held that a war, to be just, must be: (1) waged on valid
authority; (2) just with regard to its cause; and (3) animated by a right
intention.5 3 Grotius, the last great pre-modern expositor of the just war
doctrine, while attempting to ground it in natural law rather than in
Christian theology, basically accepted Aquinas' approach.5"
After Grotius, a new view gained ascendancy: that "any state could at
any time and for any reason go to war without committing an international delinquency."' 5 5 Contemporary political theory and realpolitik favored this approach. Under positivism, lack of a structuralized higher
(papal or divine) authority meant that only state-accepted treaties and
practice could bind a sovereign's international actions. Likewise, the
politics of the day embraced war as an extension of politics, a view
tinged in the 19th century by social Darwinism.
In the 20th century, some commentators have viewed various multilateral treaties, notably the United Nations Charter, as reestablishing a just
war doctrine.5" To the extent these commentators base their arguments

50. One should distinguish the just war from the holy war. The latter is fought for
faith (and when ecclesiastically sponsored becomes a crusade). The former is fought for
secular goals such as defense of territory, persons and rights. F. RUSSELL, THE JUST
WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 2 (1975). A holy war countenances the utter destruction of
the adversary and the use of unorthodox military tactics. See, e.g, the Israelite ambushes
against the people of Ai, JoSHUA 8.

51.

F.

RUSSELL,

supra note 50, at 12.

52. Id. at 18-20.
53. T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, SECUNDA SECUNDAE, Q. 40 (article 1) (T.
Heath trans. 1972).
54. See H. GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (L. Loomis trans. 1949);
Edwards, The Law of War in the Thought of Hugo Grotius, 19 J. PuB. L. 371 (1970).
Grotius expressly contemplated a third state intervening to protect the natural law rights
of the citizens of another state. See Book II, Chapter XXV of ON THE LAW OF WAR
AND PEACE, supra, entitled "On the Causes of Undertaking War on Behalf of Others."
55. Kunz, Sanctions in InternationalLaw, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 324, 325 (1960).
56. Shaw, Revival of the Just War Doctrine?, 3 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 156, 164-67
(1977). Other treaties thought to re-establish the doctrine include: The Versailles Peace

Treaty, June 28, 1919, 5

UNPERFECTED

TREATIES OF THE UNITED

STATES OF

1 (C. Wiktor ed. 1980) (art. 231: German reparations to the Allies for their
injuries sustained as a "consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of
Germany and its allies"); The Convention of the League of Nations (art. 10: "The
AMERICA
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on the article 51 right to self-defense, they overstate their case. Article 51
establishes a formal, procedural requirement (self-defense against an
armed attack), rather than substantive norms that might constitute a just
war doctrine. The Security Council, however, utilizing Chapter VII
could-but did not-develop a just war theory to enforce certain Charter-based rights of peoples (as in South Africa) by deploying collective
force to remove a government guilty of unjust behavior toward its own
population insofar as the Council judges that regime to have created a
threat to the peace by its wrongful policies.
A modern theory, which has become known as the Reagan Doctrine, 5
has contemporarily revived the "just war" theory. This policy advocates
one law for good freedom fighters combating evil regimes (the Contras of
Nicaragua, the Mujahedeen of Afghanistan and Jonas Savimbi in Angola are preferred examples) and quite another for evil insurgents fighting good democratic regimes (the Irish Republican Army in Northern
Ireland, the Palestine Liberation Organization in Israel and the rebels in
El Salvador)."
Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression
the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the
League"); Geneva Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 1928 (the "Kellogg Pact"), 46
Stat. 2343, T.I.A.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (art. I: The High Contracting Parties
solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to
war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of
national policy in their relations with one another"); Charter of the International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546 (art. 6, para. a: defining a "crime
against peace" as the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression").
57. Address by Ambassador Kirkpatrick, National Press Club (May 30, 1985). The
Reagan Doctrine is not the only twentieth century attempt to revive the just war doctrine. The Soviet Union has long maintained that "Ijiust wars . . . are not wars of conquest but wars of liberation, waged to defend the people from foreign attack and from
attempts to enslave them, or to liberate the people from capitalist slavery, or, lastly, to
liberate colonies and dependent countries from the yoke of imperialism." COMMISSION
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE

C.P.S.U.,

HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS) 167-68 (1939). The modern Non-Aligned Movement has also upheld the just war doctrine, one result being the provisions of Protocol I,
discussed supra note 22 and accompanying text. A 1973 General Assembly resolution
dramatically put forth this position: "Colonial peoples have the inherent right to struggle
by all necessary means at their disposal against colonial Powers and alien domination in
exercise of their right of self-determination. . . ." G.A. Res. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 30), at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). See also G.A. Res. 2105, 20 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 14), at 3, U.N. Doc. A/6104 (1965). For a case study see Dugard,
SWAPO: The Jus Ad Bellum and The Jus In Bello, 93 S. AFR. L.J. 144 (1976).
58. It may strike some as odd to see Pyle intellectually ranged on the side of Aquinas
and Ronald Reagan, while Judge Sofaer, with Porfiry, firmly opposes the effort to reinOF THE

19871

LEGITIMACY AND TERRORISM

One can square the Reagan Doctrine with Aquinas but not with
Porfiry's proposition. Even within the State Department's antiterrorism
team, occasional hints of doubts about Porfiry emerge. Robert B. Oakley,
then Acting Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, explained in a
1986 speech to the Conference of United States Mayors that terrorism is
largely absent in the United States "in good part, due to the deep-rooted
belief of Americans that there are peaceful means of political change and
for improving one's economic situation, that our system is ultimately responsive. '' It would follow that other governments' unresponsiveness is
a contributing factor in generating terrorism. Why should a legal norm
be blind to that?
It is evident that law based on what-the definition of conduct by the
actor purely in terms of externalized acts-is much simpler to write,
understand and apply than a law that takes the quality of the motive and
of the victim into account. One can state the simplistic common law
against cannibalism in the sentence set to music by Donald Swann,
"Eating people is wrong."6' The sophisticated German law permitting
the eating of people in certain enumerated circumstances could well run
to several paragraphs in an effort to be neither over- nor under-inclusive
and requires tough judgment calls on a case-by-case basis. The English
passenger in a lifeboat would know exactly what the common law requires of him. The German passenger might be in some doubt. The
Englishman, however, would probably consider his country's law distinctly unreasonable-perhaps illegitimate-under the circumstances, a
feeling the German probably would not have about his country's code.
The characteristics of legal simplicity and complexity suggest structural concomitants. One of these is that idiots' law more or less applies
itself, while sophists' law requires an effective judiciary or some other
credible institutionalized and legitimate interpreter of the law's meaning
in each instance of its application. The "just war" doctrine was sophists'
law, and during the Middle Ages the papacy assumed the role of legitimate and legitimating determiner of which wars qualified as just.6 1

troduce the muddle between pitying those who are driven to violence and making their

acts legal. At this early stage of our analysis, however, the consistency of the adversaries
is only of marginal interest. Our first objective must be to understand the basic jurispru-

dential theories that underpin Porfiry's proposition and Pyle's counterproposition.
59.

86

DEP'T ST. BULL.

No. 2113, at 1, 2 (1986).

60. D. Swann and M. Flanders, At the Drop of a Hat (1957) (stage show).
61. Even during the Middle Ages, papal neutrality was questioned. This skepticism
finds expression in the demand that combatants, including those serving in a nominally
just war, serve penance for inflicting injury on the enemy. F. RUSSELL, supra note 50, at
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Gregory VII taught that only wars pursuant to papal command were
just and that participants in other combat courted perdition. 2 As the
papacy declined, however, monarchs became the self-serving judges of
whether their cause was just, and papal approval became merely "a useful adjunct, if not an absolutely necessary one."" 3 With that, the sophists'
rule withered and gave way to idiots' law: first, that all war was legal,
and, later, that all war-making (except in self-defense) is illegal. To take
another of our examples: if the law punishes alike all cannibalism, one
need only establish a straightforward fact for the law's structures to become applicable. Likewise, in the case of the Provisional Irish Republican Army gunman apprehended in the United States, as Pyle indignantly points out, almost the only thing the new extradition treaty allows
the American court to determine is whether probable cause exists to believe that the defendant shot someone. In cases involving sophists' law,
however, the courts become far more important. In dealing with cannibalism, judges need to determine not only whether someone was eaten
and by whom, but also whether the hungry people in the lifeboat would
have died had they not resorted to cannibalism, whether they had reason
to believe they would not soon be rescued, whether they followed a fair
procedure in determining which of them must die to save the rest and
myriad other why and to whom issues. Judges of a high level of probity
would be necessary were Pyle to have his way in having extradition requests referred to "judicial inquiries into the capacity of foreign regimes
to do justice"" as well as into the appropriateness of the victim's murder
in light of the aims of the killers and the repressiveness of the regime,
not to mention the victim's actual role as a cog in the wheel of authority.
Let us put these instrumental and institutional concomitants of the
choice between idiots' and sophists' law into still a different international
context. We have already noted in connection with the United States
invasion of Grenada that article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
states what looks like a simple idiots' norm. It prohibits a clearly defined
activity: the use of force by one state against the independence or terri-

62. Id., at 34-35; Shaw, supra note 56, at 163.
63. Muldoon, The Remonstrance of the Irish Princes and the Canon Law Tradition
of the Just War, 22 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 309, 313 (1978). Muldoon chronicles the
unsuccessful Irish attempt to persuade the Pope to revoke his bill authorizing the English
invasion of Ireland. The need to strengthen England as a political counterweight to
France determined the papal position. Id. at 323. Muldoon concludes: "The Irish were
the first in what proved to be a long line of people on the edges of European society who
looked to the papacy for justice against their conquerors. Like all the others, the Irish
were doomed to frustration." Id. at 325.
64. Pyle, supra note 39, at 78.
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tory of another. This provision is related to article 51 of the Charter,
which is also cast in straight-arrow-like what language. It permits the
use of force in self-defense in response to an armed attack. The simplicity of these two formulations is due to several factors. For one, it is
sometimes easier in a world of diverse states to agree on a simple what
formula to regulate activity deemed aberrant. After the world's experience with Nazi aggression, in the mood prevailing at the end of World
War II, it was easy to get states to agree, in principle, to prohibit all use
of force except in defense against an armed attack. At San Francisco
there was little support 5 for trying to draft a more complex set of exculpatory exceptions distinguishing between permissible and impermissible
uses of force, in part because the parties realized that this might fail and
cause the unravelling of the apparent agreement already achieved. At
this time it was also thought that collective use of force by the United
Nations acting under chapter 7 of the Charter would make spelling out
the circumstances in which states would remain entitled to defend themselves, either alone or in small alliances, less important. To put this proposition another way: sophists' law is an attainable option primarily
when rooted in a high level of socialization. Perhaps a time existed
when, with papal guidance, the handful of fledgling nations of the Holy
Roman Empire held commonly shared notions of what constituted a just
or an unjust war. Even then, the Arab world or the Chinese would not
have shared these notions. In the modern world of 170 states with vastly
diverse history and aculturation, it is far less likely that the international
community could reach a general agreement as to whether the Palestine
Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army, Savimbi's UNITA
or the Contras were "justified" in killing a particular soldier, civil servant, banker or bus driver.
That the world is not ready for a sophists' code on most highly
politicized problems, of which terrorism is an example, may suggest that
Sofaer is right to point to idiots' law as all that the international legal
community could reasonably achieve in a world insufficiently socialized
to support anything more sophisticated. Certainly one might conclude
that if there is not even sufficient socialization-commonality of purpose-in the international community to facilitate such an idiots' law
approach, axiomatically it would be a waste of time to seek to overcome
that obstacle by trying to draft a sophists' law on the same subject.
Yet this is exactly what the United Nations General Assembly yen-

65. Rather, debate concentrated on efforts to broaden the definition of impermissible
use of force, for example, to include economic sanctions. See, e.g., Doc. 784, 1/1/27, 6
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 331, 334-35 (1945).
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tured to do in 1972 at the initiative of Secretary-General Kurt
Waldheim. 6 For two years, negotiations demonstrated the futility of this
pursuit. Numerous governments made efforts to overcome resistance to
any law on terrorism by trying to include exculpatory why and to whom
language.67 The Government of Senegal, for example, proposed on behalf of the Non-Aligned Group that the prohibition of terrorism should
not only include "Acts of Violence and other repressive acts by colonial,
racist and alien regimes against peoples struggling for liberation, for
their legitimate right to self-determination, independence and other
human rights and fundamental freedoms" but should specifically exculpate those acting on "the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other
forms of alien domination" in recognition of "the legitimacy of their
struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements."6'
The Soviet Union demanded exemption for "acts committed in resisting
an aggressor in territories occupied by the latter, and action by workers
to secure their rights against the yoke of exploiters."6 " This effort demonstrates the international system's infinite capacity for the wild goose
chase. By including sophisticated exculpatory clauses that the General
Assembly meant to give privileges to various client movements, but
which they necessarily drafted with such generality that they could mean
anything to anyone, the sponsors signalled their preference for a law
that, intended or not, would allow anyone to do almost anything. Judge
Sofaer is not the first United States Government official to reject an
agreement based on such evident nonmeeting of minds.
Even so, this does not demonstrate that an international idiots' law on
terrorism is structurally preferable to sophists' law. The contrary might
well be true if sufficient agreement on content existed, because idiots' law
has other built-in problems. Let us look again at the United Nations
Charter's provisions prohibiting use of force by states. Most nations will

66. Request for Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Twenty-Seventh Session, 27 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/8791 (1972); U.N. Doc. A/8791/Add.1
(1972).
67. See, e.g., Observationsof States Submittid in Accordance with GeneralAssembly

Res. 3034 (XXVII), U.N. Doc. A/AC.160/1 (1973); U.N. Doc. A/AC.160/1/Add.1
(1973); U.N. Doc. A/AC.160/1/Add.2 (1973).
68. U.N. Doc. A/AC.160/3/Add.2, at 3 (1973).
69. U.N. Doc. A/AC.160/2, at 7 (1973). However, Ambassador Oakley has reported a new Soviet "awareness that distinctions must be made between so-called liberation movements and groups whose objectives and operations are primarily directed toward producing terror, and whose targets are often unrelated to their putative 'liberation'
goals." Oakley, supra note 1, at 628.
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agree that articles 2(4) and 51, while relatively clear and appropriate as
far as they go, are not sufficient to meet even a simple test of rationality,
let alone appropriateness, once one approaches the margins. For example, a literal reading of the law clearly compels a threatened state to wait
until a nuclear warhead has actually hit it ("armed attack") before the
law authorizes the state to deploy its own forces in self-defense.7 0 Such a
law lacks essential legitimacy because it is evidently absurd. One could
expect no nation to carry out that rule, so what nation would impose it
on itself? Nor does our awareness that it would be virtually impossible
for nations to agree on a more sophisticated formulation that would codify a set of normative propositions bringing the why and to whom factors
to bear on a new definition of lawful first use of military force mitigate
its absurdity. The idiots' rule, as almost everyone knows, is unreasonable, at least at the margins, and on even lesser provocation than a threat
of nuclear obliteration, many governments have widely disobeyed it with
virtual impunity. Yet a sophists' rule, which in theory could be much
more reasonable, more humane and more likely to accord with preponderant conduct-in short, more legitimate-is beyond our consensual
reach.
Idiots' laws, it seems, are unsophisticated in their lack of fine tuning
and, thus, the international community is likely to perceive them-at the
margins-as unreasonable or illegitimate. Sophists' laws, on the other
hand, may (but need not) be more rational, fair and sensible; but, they
may also be a chimera, an invitation to endless negotiations in pursuit of
an agreed legal formula that, even if achieved, would be incapable of
legitimate practical application. The contorted, essentially incomprehensible United Nations General Assembly definition of aggression, especially with its convoluted loopholes in article 7, provides a good
example.7
It thus becomes apparent that two structural implications of choosing
to regulate through idiots' law are that countries may reach agreement
more readily and that the law will be easier to apply. But there will
probably be legitimacy costs at the margins. The companion structural
implication of choosing to regulate through sophists' law is that, while
states will often see such law as more closely in accord with popular
reason and with actual behavior than idiots' law, agreement on its content may be delayed, impossible, or illusory. Furthermore, its application

70. See Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 820-22 (1970).
71. G.A. Res. 3314(XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), at 142, U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1974); see Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71
AM. J. INT'L L. 224 (1977).
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in practice will lead to further intense controversy and legitimacy crises.
The illusory quality of much sophists' law stems from the difficulty of
achieving general perceptive confluence, in actual cases, with regard to
such complex phenomena as motive or provocation. That difficulty permeates the law's drafting and, particularly, its implementation. The previously noted rule in Geneva Protocol I of 1977, which requires prisoner
of war treatment for guerrillas fighting "colonialism, racism or alien
domination" was difficult to formulate, but its application to an actual
civil conflict is sure to be more difficult, even as between parties that
accept it. Which rebellions qualify? Is Jonas Savimbi's army fighting for
self-determination against the "domination" of "alien" Cubans? What is
the implication of the exculpatory to whom-"colonialism, racism or
alien domination"-for those fighting the Governments of Israel and
Britain or, for that matter, for persons thinking of shooting officers of the
United States Department of the Interior on Indian reservations or in
Puerto Rico?
Structurally, unilateral, self-serving applications of those rules, interpretations made by interested parties in a manner which carries little
conviction and less legitimacy, tend to dissipate, in practice, the gains in
conceptual legitimacy made by recourse to sophists' law. For example,
applying the proposed international norms known as the Reagan Doctrine, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick has argued that United States support for the Nicaraguan Contras is permissible, while Soviet and Cuban
support for the Sandinistas is not because the Contras are democrats
fighting a totalitarian regime while the Sandinistas are totalitarians that
Russians and Cubans are using to colonize Nicaragua.7 2 Even if one
accepts the sophists' norms of the Reagan Doctrine, any auto-application
that an interested party arbitrarily makes in an actual dispute is bound
to arouse the widespread skepticism that bespeaks lack of legitimacy.
This is not necessarily a matter of bad norms or of lying actors. Wittgenstein has charged that no "course of action could be determined by a rule
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the
rule."173 Even if this overstates the case, it is undoubtedly true that as a
rule become more complex, the legitimacy of the rule's application and,
ultimately, of the rule itself, becomes increasingly dependent not only on
the degree of common community understanding of the rule's content but
also on the perceived legitimacy of the process by which the community
applies the rule.

72. Kirkpatrick, supra note 57.
73.

WITTGENSTEIN,

scombe trans. 1953).

PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 81,

para. 201 (G.E. An-
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Were it not for the lack of global agreement on sophisticated legal
principles incorporating why and to whom factors and, even more, the
absence of credible institutions to apply such inevitably complex formulations, most of us would probably reject Porfiry's proposition and opt
for sophists' law whenever possible. Under the circumstances, however,
the choice between idiots' law and sophists' law becomes much more difficult as one understands the structural implications of each. Certainly
on its face sophists' law usually sounds more reasonable than does idiots'
law because, logically, the reasonableness of a general principle must
survive its application at the margins. If a patent absurdity results from
the only possible application of the evident meaning of a simple rule in
circumstances requiring a more calibrated response, then that law has
suffered reductio ad absurdum, a condition that may also, to some extent, delegitimize its application even in other, perfectly appropriate circumstances not at its margin. Mr. Bumble's conclusion that "if the law
supposes that, the law is a ass -a idiot" is the most human of reactions,
a demonstration of the legitimacy costs inherent in idiots' law.
However, a rule finely calibrated to reflect sophisticated why and to
whom considerations also fails to escape reductio ad absurdum, albeit
because of a different structural deficiency. The flaw of the idiots' rule is
the obverse of its merit: it provides a simple, easily understood and readily applicable principle of regulation, but one which, because of its simplicity, is unable to bend or to avoid occasional patently unacceptable
results. The flaw of the sophists' law is that while in the abstract it
embodies a carefully calibrated system of regulatory and exculpatory
principles, the text's very complexity, like the Internal Revenue Code,
invites dispute as to whether the law is applicable in any particular case.
In the domestic context the system provides the opportunity to have
any particular application of the law litigated before a tribunal that the
society generally trusts to be fair and principled, which tends to ameliorate the problem. In the international community, a shortage exists of
comparable, legitimate institutions capable of legitimating the law's application. As a result, sophists' laws are delegitimized by their illegitimate application, which usually takes the form of self-serving assertions
by an interested party in the course of an action of disputed legality.
VI.

THE RIGHT QUESTION

We have seen that Porfiry's proposition is not self-evidently justified.
Instead, we confront what turns out to be a Hobbesian choice forcing us
to choose between regulating a social problem by laws that are simple
and straightforward but lack rationality and cannot command general
adherence at their margins and regulating a social problem by laws that
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are complex and sophisticated, but as to which general consensus and
general adherence are hard to achieve and which require an impartial
system of application that is not readily available in the international
community. Both choices have advantages and disadvantages. Both have
potential-and different-legitimacy costs and benefits. To prefer, in
general, on the basis of functional and theoretical analysis, either idiots'
law or sophists' law as a tool for social control is impossible. Porfiry's
proposition provides neither the wrong nor the right answer to terrorism.
It is merely one of two polar possibilities for confronting terrorism normatively. The energetic claims of functional and moral superiority that
the champions of both kinds of law make do not stand up to rational
analysis.
Despite the spirited advocacies of a Sofaer or a Pyle, no theoretical
basis exists for choosing between the two polarities nor among the various middle positions that we have not examined for reasons of economy.
This does not, however, leave the jurisprudential analyst stranded in the
intellectual equivalent of Death Valley. In setting aside a theoretically
irresolvable question, we have encountered a different, but related quandary from which conceptual theory can provide an epistemologically justifiable exit. The right question is this: what is necessary to make either
legal tool-the idiots' law or the sophists' law-effective in the regulation of terrorism? The answer to that question leads directly back to the
concept of legitimacy. We have argued that if a law is to effect social
control it must elicit general adherence, be perceived to operate rationally in relation to the desired objective and be fairly, consistently and
generally applied. As we have observed, both simple what-based law and
more complex law that embraces exculpatory why and to whom factors
have different structural characteristics that tend to create legitimacy deficits. An appropriate task for the lawyer is to see whether, and how,
those deficits can be transformed into legitimacy surpluses by the functional transformation of each structural system.
VII.

FUNCTIONAL RESTRUCTURING

Sophist law could make the clearly superior claim to legitimacy if: (1)
one could draft such a law on the basis of a genuine, shared set of community values underpinning agreed norms; and (2) general agreement
existed to have the law uniformly applied in controversial cases by a
binding system of decision-making that the affected community deems
fair and the decisions of which are ordinarily respected and obeyed.
Those who advocate the deployment of sophists' law to make their
system viable thus have an obligation not only to come up with a draft of
meaningful, rationally-defensible norms that the preponderance of the
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affected community will likely deem acceptable-itself a formidable
quest-but they must also propose a system for applying those norms
impartially and consistently to difficult cases. Sophist normative proposals lacking this latter ingredient tend to be mere applications for hunting
licenses.
Third World efforts to make the prohibition and punishment of terrorist acts inapplicable to forces fighting colonialism, racism and alien
domination are rightly suspect on that count, and one cannot allay the
suspicion until the advocates of such exculpatory caveats demonstrate
how the case-by-case application of their proposed sophist norm can be
made by a process bestowing legitimacy on the outcome.
The Reagan Doctrine is another good example of this obligation not
being adequately discharged. The Doctrine proposes the following norms
for regulating the use of violence in the conduct of states during
insurgency:
1. Any state may aid a democratic regime fighting an undemocratic
rebellion.
2. Any state may aid a democratic rebellion fighting against an undemocratic regime.
3. No state may aid an undemocratic regime fighting a democratic
rebellion.
4. No 74
state may aid an undemocratic rebellion fighting a democratic
regime.
There is no doubt that the Reagan Doctrine, thus stated as a set of
norms, has intellectual appeal. It is highly sophisticated, with a complex
blueprint to regulate and exculpate state conduct and to distinguish between state terrorism and state altruism. It takes a value position
squarely on behalf of freedom, according rights to those who fight to
retain or establish it superior to those the law proposes to accord totalitarian regimes or guerrillas. Unfortunately, in a world governed by a
preponderance of regimes that, to varying degrees, exhibit totalitarian
tendencies, it is very unlikely that anyone can draft such a sophisticated
blueprint around a meaningful convergence of intentionality. That we
could expect those norms to be manifested consistently in preponderant
state conduct is even less likely. At a minimum, however, those who
champion the adoption of such a formula have an obligation to devise
and demonstrate their commitment to a process by which the proposed

74.

Kirkpatrick, -supra note 57. See also Cutler, The Right to Intervene, 64 FoR96 (1985); Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: ConstructingCharter
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norms would be applied in a consistent, principled manner by a process
of credible legitimacy. In other words, if one wants to resuscitate the just
war doctrine, one must also resuscitate the legitimizing role of a papacy.
Pyle, one should recall, advocates sophists' law to regulate extradition
of persons accused of terrorist acts, replete with various complex exculpatory why and to whom factors. But Pyle has a legitimizing system of
application in mind-the United States federal judiciary, whose legitimacy the national community widely accepts and which we could expect
to apply his proposed norms with reasoned, principled decisions.
The champions of the Reagan Doctrine, it is all too evident, have proposed no comparable means to raise the legitimacy quotient of their sophisticated normative proposal. On the contrary, the Reagan Administration has concurrently taken the United States out of the general
mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (article
36(2) of its Statute) without advancing any alternative. When the United
States claims a right to aid such governments fighting rebellion as those
of Chad or El Salvador, but also the right to aid rebels such as those
fighting in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola and Kampuchea, the contention that these particular regimes and these designated rebels represent
the forces of democratic light fighting against totalitarian darkness has
no more credibility than any self-interested assertion by a party seeking
to justify an opportunistic act the normativity of which, even by the Reagan Administration's own proposed sophist rules, is widely doubted.
Thus, the doctrine fails the test of efficacy because it lacks perceived
legitimacy.
The capacity of the United States to persuade other states that it is
acting within its own proclaimed normative framework is virtually nil.
The Reagan Doctrine fails even at the hortatory level of reasoned discourse: other governments see it as, quite starkly, a plea for universal
acceptance of America's right to do as it pleases in support of what it
perceives to be democratic forces around the world while calling on other
nations to demonstrate their faith in our good sense by a selfless gesture
of suspended disbelief. But if that is what one hears the Reagan Doctrine to be about, it is not what the Doctrine says. The gulf between text
and conduct thus further widens the legitimacy gap. The Doctrine purports to propose a new system of rules, but the proposers' failure to deal
with its elementary structural-as distinct from conceptual-defects
makes perfectly evident that its principal purpose is not to establish a
new norm but only to repeal existing restraints such as those in articles
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2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter."
Idiots' law starts with a legitimacy advantage. It usually expresses a
real, as opposed to a chimeric, agreement-at least at the time governments propounded it. It is easily understood. By denying any exculpatory exceptions it assures that fewer loopholes will exist. It almost applies itself. Its legitimacy costs derive from a structural failure to
overcome problems of absurdity at the margins, which makes it appear
unreasonable and thus undermines the prediction of general adherence.
When United States lawyers argue in favor of our right to support a
Contra insurgency in Nicaragua while Judge Sofaer deplores all exculpatory departures from a simple what-based prohibition on anti-state violence, the resultant cognitive dissonance demonstrates the weakness of
Porfiry's proposition: to keep all one's ducks marching in orderly fashion
behind a simple concept's linear projection into an infinity of hypothetical situations is almost impossible. Idiots' law invites reductio ad
absurdum.
The advocate of the idiots' law approach to the regulation of a generally recognized societal disorder is thus obliged-like the advocate of a
sophists' law-to seek the amelioration of this potentially delegitimizing
structural defect. One way is to deconstruct the category of activity being
regulated. Often other good reasons exist for doing this. Narrowing the
subject matter of a proposed norm can help create the consensus lacking
for a broader rule. Thus, terrorism, as a category of regulated activity,
has sensibly given way to such subsidiary regulatory categories as hostage-taking,76 violence directed against diplomats 77 and aerial hi-

75. See Schachter, supra note 36; Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed
Force, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 1620 (1984).
76. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 7. The
negotiations for the Hostages Convention reveal the opposition that an idiots' rule, even
one for a compartmentalized activity, faces. Attempts at a reformulation of the Convention ranged in sophistication. Several delegations suggested the Convention should only
protect "innocent" hostages. See, e.g., Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting
of an InternationalConvention Against the Taking of Hostages, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 39), at 38, U.N. Doc. A/32/39 (1977) (statement of Egypt), at 40 (statement of
Guinea, using Ian Smith as an illustrative guilty hostage). The Tanzanian delegate proposed an exculpatory clause and provided an umpire: "For the purposes of the Convention, the term 'taking of hostages' shall not include any act or acts carried out in the
process of national liberation against colonial rule, racist and foreign regimes, by liberation movements recognized by the United Nations or regional organizations." U.N. Doc.
A/AC.188/L.5 (1977). The Pakistani delegate wished to condition invocation of the
Hostages Convention against national liberation movements on the target state's acceptance of both the Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/
SR.62 at 2 (1979). See supra note 28. In response, the French delegate argued: "[The]
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jacking."8 As to these, at least, the preponderance of the global community appears genuinely willing to accept a common rule. The
international community can do more along such micro-legal lines with
collective remedies directed toward violence against children, or more
generally against civilians not in government service, or even against persons not owing allegiance to the targeted government. The 1977 Geneva
Protocols already pursue some of these regulatory objectives. If that
treaty proves unacceptable for other reasons, then perhaps the United
States could work with other states to ensure that specialized conventions
could protect the same categories of persons.
Although the principal purpose of such deconstruction is to widen the
ambit of social acceptance for a regulatory scheme, an equally important
effect is to regulate activities which are unacceptable under any circumstances while leaving unregulated most of those as to which a broader
idiot's law would encounter trouble at the margins. For example, the
United States has met the test of legitimation by agreeing to carry out its
obligation to prosecute or extradite, which the Hague Convention imposes, 79 even in cases involving hijackers who have fled East bloc oppression.8 0 While the dissident hijackers may have our sympathy, most

taking of hostages was an act which must be condemned absolutely and which no circumstance or grounds could justify, regardless of the nobility of the cause for which it

might have been committed." Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an
InternationalConvention Against the Taking of Hostages, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
39), at 64, U.N. Doc. A/33/39 (1978). The French position ultimately prevailed. See
supra note 7.
77. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against International
Protected Persons, supra note 33. See also Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of
Terrorism, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413. The latter, an OAS version
of the International Protected Persons Convention, specifically condemns all physical attacks on diplomats, "regardless of motive." (art. 2). One can analogize this protection
afforded diplomats to the eleventh century Peace of God doctrine that declared certain
classes, especially the clergy, exempt from all violence. F. RUSSELL, supra note 50, at 34.
78. Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 [hereinafter Hague Convention]; Montreal Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23,
1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
79. Hague Convention, supra note 78, arts. 7, 8.
80. This scenario most notably occurred when an East German hijacked a Polish
airliner to West Berlin. As an outgrowth of the historical and jurisdictional freak that is
Berlin, the hijacker was charged with crimes under West German law, but the United
States prosecuted and tried him in an American court. The United States ambassador to
West Germany appointed a New Jersey federal district judge, Hon. Herbert Stern, to
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Americans probably do not regard that their punishment reduces the law
to an absurdity, because Americans widely believe hijacking and bombing of airplanes is an unacceptable practice no matter what the why or to
whom factors. Americans do not deem these factors exculpatory in respect of hijacking, an activity we deem, invariably, beyond the pale. Similarly, even Islamic and Soviet diplomats, whatever their sympathies for
the Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution or their animosity to America, were
relieved when the Security Council" and the International Court of Justice8 2 resisted efforts to interpolate exculpatory why and to whom factors
into the rule protecting diplomats at the time of the seizure of United
States embassy officials by Iranian revolutionary guards. In both these
instances, the general consensus, even at the margins, supported the idiots' rule applied to a relatively narrow segment of terrorist activity,
thereby escaping the delegitimation problem of reductio ad absurdum.
Another way to narrow the field in order to base normative regulation
on manifest common intent and thus avoid the delegitimizing effect of
reductio ad absurdum is to seek the law's application to a smaller community. The United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty illustrates this second form of deconstruction. Both parties inter se are ready
to accept a far broader, simpler rule to deal harshly with those who use
violence against the authorities than they would vis-a-vis the international community as a whole. The idiots' law that the United StatesUnited Kingdom Extradition Treaty sets out is less vulnerable to reductio ad absurdum precisely because the United States has not repealed
the legal concept of sanctuary for all political offenders, but only for
those from Britain, which we believe to have a relatively open legal-

preside over the trial. See H. STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN (1984). Judge Stem, applying United States constitutional law, determined that the defendant was entitled to a jury
trial (despite the anomaly that juries generally do not exist under German law). United
States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979). Impanelling a jury of West
Berliners to judge an East German "refugee" raised the spectre that the jury would
refuse to convict the defendant in the American tradition of jury nullification. See
Lowenfeld, Hijacking, Freedom, and the "American Way," 83 MICH. L. Rnv. 1000,
1005 (1985). In other words, the jury would in effect graft a sophist clause upon the
idiots' law of the Hague Convention. In the end, the jury did acquit the defendant of
hijacking but convicted him of hostage-taking. Stem, supra, at 350. Judge Stern, affronted throughout the trial by the American prosecutor's stance that the Constitution
was inapplicable to West Berlin and skeptical that parole (which he thought appropriate) would be granted, sentenced the hostage-taker to time served (nine months) and
released him from custody. Stern, supra at 369-70.
81. S.C. Res. 461, U.N. Doc. S/13711/Rev. 1 (1979).
82. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
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political system capable of accommodating legitimate dissent and change
supervised by a legitimate judiciary.
Judge Sofaer spelled this out in his statement in support of the treaty
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 1, 1985. He
said that the "political offenses exception has no place in extradition
treaties between stable democracies in which the political system is available to redress legitimate grievances and the judicial process provides fair
treatment. . . . [W]e fully intend to negotiate. . . similar agreements
with other nations that meet these criteria." 3 But what of states that do
not? Is Sofaer admitting that the United States should grant political
asylum to terrorists who commit the offenses listed in the United StatesUnited Kingdom treaty against more venal regimes or that such terrorists should at least be exempt from mandatory extradition? If so,
Sofaer is not, after all, totally committed to Porfiry's proposition. He
knows that the Congress, the public and, no doubt, his own conscience
would preclude establishing the same extradition relationship with, for
instance, East Germany. 4
Obviously, Judge Sofaer would not extradite Hitler's assassins. Even
when he does draw upon an idiots' law, such as the United StatesUnited Kingdom treaty, closer examination reveals that the law indirectly incorporates the sophists' elements of why and to whom by careful
choice of treaty partners. How could it be otherwise, without paying
exorbitant legitimacy costs?
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

We have engaged in this rather tortuous exploration of an issue of
legal theory because we believe that action against terrorism by states
will be effective to the degree that the international community widely
perceives it to be not merely lawful (i.e., permitted by treaty or customary law or both) but also legitimate. To the extent civilized states seek
83. Sofaer, The PoliticalOffense Exception and Terrorism,85 DEP'T ST. BULL. No.
2105, at 61 (1985). But see Note, Extradition in an Era of Terrorism: The Need to
Abolish the Political Offense Exception, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 654, 684-86 (1986) (criticizing such agreements for creating an unnecessary and possibly politically inflammatory
double standard).
84. See also European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977,
reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976). Upon signing, the French delegation noted: "It is
also clear that such a high degree of solidarity as is provided for in the Council of Europe Convention can only apply between States sharing the same ideals of freedom and
democracy." 16 I.L.M. 1329 (1977). Nevertheless, article 13 of the Convention allows
for far-reaching reservations. See Wood, The European Convention on the Suppression
of Terrorism, 1981 Y.B. EUR. L. 307 (F.G. Jacobs ed. 1982).
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redress against the threat of terrorism and, in particular, state terrorism,
they should endeavor to obtain redress in circumstances where the legitimacy costs are relatively low. This is equally true whether the redress
takes the form of unilateral or multilateral acts and applies even when
those acts are strictly legal.
In practical application this suggests the following propositions:
1) If states seek redress against terrorist acts and state sponsorship of
such acts by achieving agreement on what we have called idiots' law
propositions, then we should narrowly define those norms in terms of the
activity to be criminalized. The purpose of this narrowness is to achieve
genuinely universal-or nearly universal-consent to a normative proposition that avoids reductio ad absurdum at its margins. Attacks on
children, attacks on citizens of third parties, hostage-taking, attacks on
diplomats and hijacking are examples. There is more to do along these
lines.
2) In other instances we can narrow idiot's law to avoid the reductio
ad absurdum problem by narrowing the constituency. Bilateral treaties
making all violent acts against governments nonpolitical and thus extraditable offenses are legitimate if made with states that are liberal democracies living under a rule of law and offering its citizens means of peaceful change. They are illegitimate if made with authoritarian regimes that
lack those characteristics. It is equally important to seek to implement
such treaty reform with non-Western as with Western democracies, India being an important example of a regime plagued by terrorism to
which we should offer the same consideration as we do to the United
Kingdom.
3) If states pursue a sophist law approach-and no inherent reason
exists, as we have seen, why states should not implement both idiots' law
and sophists' law simultaneously in the effort to deal with so serious a
societal disorder-then the proposing states should seek to lower the legitimacy costs by building a legitimizing process of decision-making into
each sophist legal regime. That process, rather than the party claiming
to have been wronged, should determine whether a wrong was committed, by whom, and whether there were exculpatory circumstances. The
same process should also determine the appropriate remedy or response.
Ideally, this would suggest to international lawyers a vision of nations
solemnly filing charges before the International Court of Justice. In
practice, for many reasons, this is not now a realistic scenario, if only
because of the limited number of states party to the general mandatory
jurisdiction of that tribunal under article 36(2) of its Statute.
We must explore alternatives, however, if sophist approaches to terrorism are to be taken seriously. This suggests the need to multilaterial-
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ize, regularize and perhaps institutionalize a process by which states implement any proposed sophists' law. That task is not as impossible as it
sounds. For example, an agreement between even ten or fifteen democratic states to use various coercive measures, including but not limited to
military force, against states that commit, support or condone terrorist
acts aimed at a party to the agreement or harbor such terrorists could
also include a process for collectively deciding, on the basis of evidence,
whether an accused state had committed the acts alleged, whether extenuating circumstances applied and what countermeasures were permissible. Such a multilateral determination could legitimate either a collective
response or merely legitimize a unilateral one by the injured complaint
state. 85
It is time to end the shadow-boxing between the supporters and the
opponents of Porfiry's proposition, for nothing productive can come of
that irresolvable, essentially useless conflict. Instead, proponents of legal
remedies of all kinds should concentrate their critical and creative faculties on the more constructive task of devising means to make proposed
remedies legitimacy-effective.

85. For a proposal along these lines see Address by Lowenfeld, "Some Suggestions
for Attaching Meaning to the International Responsibility of States for Terrorism," Institute of Air and Space Law, State U. of Leiden (Jan. 1987).

